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**Examining Police Integrity:
Categorizing Corruption Vignettes**

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ABSTRACT

A growing body of literature on police officer integrity focuses on their perceptions of corruption vignettes. The current analysis examines those vignettes using a factor analysis of Klockars' et. al. survey data of police officers in the United States. Results indicate that the historically used vignettes cluster into two factors, one that reflects more serious, and one that reflects less serious, corrupt behavior. The vignettes regarding an off-duty business and accepting free meals and other gratuities may not be perceived as corruption. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

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Introduction

Law enforcement is a crucial aspect of the criminal justice system, and the integrity of those who work within it is essential. All democratic societies recognize the important role of the police in maintaining the rule of law (Bayley, 2002). Bundled within that role is the importance that police officers live within the constraints of the law. Police are mandated to uphold the law through statutes, court decisions, and departmental rules of conduct. The boundaries created by the constitution, state, and department dictate acceptable police behavior. When officers violate established boundaries, they partake in police deviant behavior (Ivković, 2005a). When officers do not violate these boundaries, they exhibit integrity. Klockars and associates defined police integrity as “the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse rights and privileges of their occupation” (quoted in Ivković & Shelley 2008, p. 60).

Police deviance has serious social consequences including a decline in public support for police, loss of trust in the rule of law, and a general mistrust of police. Taken in context with the necessity of community involvement for effective policing, a loss of public support could be catastrophic to the community. Inconsistent practices of law enforcement often reduce the community’s confidence in police and willingness to aid in investigations because the relationship between law enforcement and the public is strongly affected by the perceived legitimacy of the police organization (Ivković, 2005a; Bayley, 2002). Further, how the police are viewed often coincides with a general perception of the entire criminal justice system. Highly publicized cases of police corruption or misconduct are especially harmful to public views of the police. Bayley (2002, p. 134) noted this type of high profile incident was the exception, not the rule: “Although the public is most concerned about dramatic infringements of the rule-of-law, such as brutality, planting false evidence, and lying in courts most of the liberties taken by police are more mundane, routinized, and difficult to detect.”

With so much at stake then, it is vital that police officers possess a great deal of integrity. ___Police agencies are constantly striving to improve recruitment, application, and training procedures and to identify those individuals best suited to fulfill the roles of the police officer. It is therefore imperative to understand the nuances of officers' perceptions of corruption to disseminate the most complete information as possible. Although researchers have argued that the environment of integrity may be *more important* than selection and training (Klockars, Ivković, Harver, and Haberfeld, 2000), it certainly has an impact worth examining. It follows that it is also important to focus that examination on how officers perceive different types of corruption so as to direct future research and also practitioners to allocate limited resources in the areas that are most problematic. It is within this context that the current analysis was launched. This paper explores whether past research on police officers' perceptions of integrity, specifically the vignettes outlined in Klockars, et.al (2000), may be reconsidered using a different method of categorization.

Police Deviance

The vignettes in Klockars, Ivković, Harver, and Haberfeld's (2000) instrument describe instances of police deviant behavior ranging in seriousness, if they were placed on a single conceptual scale, from working a second job to the unnecessary use of force. It is plausible that these vignettes are differentiated by hierarchical degrees of seriousness along that conceptual scale. It is also plausible that the vignettes cluster categorically—a possibility explored in the current analysis. Literature on police deviance often conceptualizes and defines police misconduct, corruption, and brutality as types of police deviance. Thus it is important to first review these distinctions.

Police misconduct is defined as police officers' violations of formally written rules, standard operating procedures, regulations, and criminal and civil law (Lynch & Diamond, 1983). Not all forms of police misconduct are highly scrutinized because of the general lack of well-defined and upheld rules. Operating norms within agencies sometimes differ from the law or written departmental rules (Barker & Roebuck, 1973), thus making it problematic to have one controllable standard. This point has been debated more recently by Ivković

and Shelley (2008) who argued that officer integrity was linked directly to agency integrity.

Although corruption can fall under the class of police misconduct, it is also large enough to be a single category. Definitions of corruption are influenced by the values and orientation of the researcher, officer, police department, policy and criminal statute (Barker & Carter, 1994). According to Barker and Roebuck (1973), corrupt acts that are criminal are therefore deviant by definition. However, as defined in the literature corruption is not *always* criminal and as a result controversies surround the actions of what constitutes acceptable behaviors. For example, a free cup of coffee is commonly viewed as a courtesy and is therefore not a form of corruption, while other stakeholders may define the very same behavior as such. Questions arise when the free cup of coffee becomes a free snack, a free meal, etc. Even as the behaviors become deemed more problematic, corruption is difficult to detect because many officers and administrators fail to identify or report potentially corrupt activities. Additionally, both offenders and victims who partake in corrupt activities generally benefit so there are typically few complainants, as when an officer takes cash in lieu of making an arrest. Failure to draw attention to these unwanted activities creates obstacles within the justice system and for conducting research.

While definitions vary, personal gain appears to be a crucial element in views of police corruption. Police themselves tend to view serious violations of integrity as only those activities that are engaged in for personal gain (Barker & Roebuck, 1973, Ivković, 2005a,b, Klockars et. al. 2000). Herman Goldstein, an early theorist on police corruption, also argued that corruption involved the misuse of police authority in a manner designed to produce personal gain (Goldstein, 1975). According to Barker and Carter (1994, p. 47):

Corrupt acts contain three elements: (1) They are forbidden by some law, rule, regulation, or ethical standard; (2) they involve the misuse of the officer's position; and (3) they involve some actual or expected material reward or gain. The material reward or gain can be in the form of money, goods, services, and/or discounts.

Ivković (2005a, p. 549) defined police corruption as:

an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempt of action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police

officers, characterized by the police officer's misuse of the official position motivated in significant part with the achievement of personal gain.

Excessive force and brutality, however, are often distinguished from corruption and are included instead under what Barker and Carter (1994) identified as abuse of authority. Abuse of authority was defined as having three types; physical abuse (i.e. excessive force and brutality), psychological abuse (i.e. harassment), and legal abuse (i.e. violating citizens' rights). Corruption may also be conceptually divided according to whether it serves selfish or altruistic interests. In research by Martin (1994), municipal officers in Illinois perceived accepting bribes, planting weapons on suspects, stealing property, and using drugs at the top of the most serious forms of police misconduct but perceived stopping suspects to harass, illegal searches, and conducting unauthorized records checks to be much less serious (the same or even less serious than accepting free coffee). Compared to most public opinion polls, officers were more likely to believe that illegal searches were not only acceptable behavior but justified in many cases to illustrate their authority (Martin, 1994). Some police misconduct is done not for personal gain, presumably, but in the name of public good. Illegal searches and other "bending of the rules" may be seen as necessary to fight crime. Martinelli (2006) noted that this type of behavior was termed "noble cause" corruption and was frequently used by officers performing their daily duties.

In law enforcement, "occupational deviance" has become the leading framework for understanding police misconduct and corruption. Police occupational deviance is defined as both the criminal and non-criminal deviant acts committed during normal work activities or under the guise of an officers authority (Barker, 1990). Occupational deviance is generally exhibited in the forms of police misconduct and police corruption which are applied to the police officers role as an employee rather than the duties of policing (Barker & Carter, 1994). The role of an officer is strongly influenced by the perception of occupational environment. Each occupation has its own distinctive norms, standards, and rules of conduct. Individuals who share common work environments also share similar occupational deviant behavior. For example, sleeping on the job is a common deviant behavior found among individuals who work night shifts such as nurses, police officers, and the military, and employee theft and deception is deviant

behavior common in the retail and service industries (Barker & Carter, 1994). There are many forms of deviance that can only be committed by those in a given occupation such as law enforcement. For example, only police officers can threaten to make an arrest and can accept money instead of issuing traffic citations. The one element that ties all of these acts together is that they are engaging in behavior that is provided by their occupation (Barker & Carter, 1994).

Measuring Police Integrity

Research on police integrity has occupied a significant place in the criminal justice literature for many years. Understanding the previous work builds a strong framework for studying all forms of police behavior including use of force, misconduct and corruption. Prior research includes examinations of officer's attitudes toward various violations of police integrity. Thus far studies using data from Klockars et. al. (2000) and Ivković (20033) examined specific violations of integrity. Micucci and Gomme (2005) analyzed officer's perceptions against one variable, the use of force. Marché (2009) constructed an economic model that evaluated agency size and resources and their effects on perceptions of corruption. Jenks (2009) examined officers' perceptions of moonlighting. Ivković (2005a,b) expanded the use of this data in comparative studies and Schafer & Martinelli, 2008 focused on supervisory position.

Previous research examined police officer perceptions toward separate hypothetical vignettes, which contributes to the understanding how police view single cases of integrity. However, little research has examined officer perceptions of corrupt behavior more generally. The current analysis furthers the exploration into police perceptions of police integrity by examining if perceptions of different vignettes make up a larger construct of behaviors generally viewed as corruption. It is important to know if groupings of scenarios make up clear measures of integrity instead of assuming that all of the vignettes are equally valid outcome measures of police integrity.

Klockars, Ivković, Harver, and Haberfeld (2000) ranked case scenarios based on officers' perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to report. In accordance with that ranking the authors argued that

four case scenarios (off-duty security business, accepting free meals and discounts on the beat, accepting holiday gifts, and cover-up of police DUI) were considered least serious (pg 6) while other case scenarios (bribes from a speeding motorist, crime scene theft of watch, theft from found wallet, and use of excessive force) were considered most serious. This categorization leaves three case scenarios (supervisor holiday for tune-up, auto repair shop 5% kickback, and drinks to ignore late bar closing) as midrange serious variables. This classification was based on officers' perceptions of the vignettes and will be compared to the results of the current analysis.

Methodology

Sample and Data

The data for this analysis were collected as part of a cross-national survey study of police integrity by Klockars (1999) under a grant from the United States National Institute of Justice. This dataset is the largest and most comprehensive of its kind, and as such, it is still being utilized by researchers studying officer perceptions of corrupt behavior (see for example Ivković, 2005b, Marché, 2009, and Jenks, 2009). The current analysis is based on data provided by 3,230 sworn police officers in thirty agencies across the United States (see Klockars, et al. 2000 for a complete overview of the sample).

Participants were selected through convenience sampling, which was utilized for three primary reasons (Micucci & Gomme, 2005; Haberfeld, et. al. 2000). First, a random sample could not reasonably be drawn from a population that included nearly 18,000 agencies (Walker & Katz, 2008, p. 63) of varying sizes¹, mandates, functions, organizational structures, and systems of governance and political accountability (Micucci & Gomme, 2005, p. 492). Second, police cooperation is suspect and difficult to obtain when studying any type of police behavior that could be considered corrupt (Haberfeld, et. al. 2000; Micucci & Gomme, 2005). Third, expanding the knowledge of police behavior that was underreported and under-recorded was not 'readily amenable to achievement through random

¹ For a complete review of the effect of agency size on officer's perceptions using Klockars et. al. (2000) data see Marché (2009).

sampling techniques' (Micucci & Gomme, 2005, p. 492; Haberfeld, et. al. 2000).² The sample does not include state police agencies and includes only one sheriff's office and one county police agency. Thus, the sample over-represents municipal police agencies. The sample also over-represents police agencies from the Northeast region of the US, although it does contain some agencies from the South, Southeast, and Southwest. Further, although it was stressed that participation would be kept confidential, many agencies did not accept the invitation to participate in the study. These agencies may have feared revealing potentially unbecoming information. Thus, the sample also disproportionately represents police agencies more receptive to research.

The purpose of the original research was to collect quantitative data that can be used to search for answers to the following five questions (Klockars, et al., 2000):

1. What is the level of knowledge of organizational rules governing corruption?
2. How strongly does the occupational culture support these rules?
3. To what extent does The Code protect officers who violate agency rules prohibiting corrupt behavior?
4. What punishment is accepted for violation of these rules?
5. To what extent are the views of the individual officer different from the norm of the occupational culture?

This data were collected via a self-administered anonymous questionnaire that presented eleven different hypothetical case scenarios, displayed as Figure 1. A traditional approach to studying perception of crime severity has been through the development of vignettes. Case scenarios provide the opportunity to analyze respondents' perception about a range of topics while focusing on their opinions and behavioral intentions. Each scenario was followed by seven questions asking participants to rate the seriousness of the behavior, type of disciplinary action required, and likelihood of reporting the behavior, displayed as Figure 2. The scenarios are based on Barker and Roebuck's (1973) typology of police corruption and were familiar to citizens and representative of a modern day industrialized society, and special attention was paid to issues of cultural

² For a more detailed description of these reasons, please see Haberfeld et. al. 2000; and Micucci and Gomme, 2005.

neutrality when creating the hypothetical situations. Participants were asked to assume the role of the officer in each scenario—one who has been a police officer for five years with a satisfactory work record and no history of disciplinary problems. To ensure respondent confidentiality and participation, participants were only asked questions about their perceptions, not their personal experiences.

Figure 1: Klockars, 1999 Instrument—Scenarios

CORRUPTION CASE SCENARIOS

- Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
- Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
- Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
- Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
- Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
- Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the owner.
- Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behavior.
- Case 8. At 2 a.m. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
- Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him about two blocks before apprehending him and tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After his is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

Figure 2: Klockars, 1999 Instrument—Assessment Questions

CASE SCENARIO ASSESSMENT OPTIONS

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious Very Serious

1 2 3 4 5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious Very Serious

1 2 3 4 5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?

Definitely not Definitely yes

1 2 3 4 5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. NONE | 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY |
| 2. VERBAL REPRIMAND | 5. DEMOTION IN RANK |
| 3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND | 6. DISMISSAL |

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do you think WOULD follow?

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. NONE | 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY |
| 2. VERBAL REPRIMAND | 5. DEMOTION IN RANK |
| 3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND | 6. DISMISSAL |

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not Definitely yes

1 2 3 4 5

7. Do you think MOST POLICER OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not Definitely yes

1 2 3 4 5

The questionnaire also asked a small number of questions about participants' agency size, rank, length of service as an officer and at current agency, type of assignment, and supervisor status. Demographics such as age, race, and sex were excluded and a limited number of questions were asked to decrease the chances of participant identification and increase response rates. It was thought that officers would be less likely to answer questions about corruption if any identifying characteristics were included (Klockars, et. al. 2000, p 6). The final questions directly asked "Do you think that most police officers would give their honest opinions in filling out this questionnaire?" followed by "Did you?" Eighty-four percent of respondents reported that they thought most officers answered the questions honestly. Ninety-seven percent reported they answered the questions honestly. The police officers who did not report honestly were excluded from the analysis.

Descriptive statistics were computed to provide more details on the sample (see Table 1). A majority (59.8%) of respondents worked in very large agencies of over five hundred employees, while many of the remaining officers worked in medium-sized (76-200) agencies. Sixty-nine percent of respondents held the rank of patrol at the time of survey completion, while the rest were relatively evenly divided between the ranks of sergeant, detective or command staff. Regarding length of service, the highest percentage of officers were on the job between 6-10 years, with rather even percentages falling between 3-5 years and in each of the categories over 10 years. Finally, 78.4% of respondents reported that their assignment was as either patrol, on call, control or traffic, with 10.5% assigned to investigative or detective responsibilities, and 11.1% serving administrative or other assignments.

Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Agency Size (N=3232)		
Very small (less than 25)	93	2.9
Small (26-75)	215	6.7
Medium (76-200)	739	22.9
Large (201-500)	251	7.8
Very large (more than 500)	1934	59.8
Rank (N=3174)		
Patrol	2190	69.0
Sergeant	369	11.6
Detective	380	12.0
Command Staff	235	7.4
Length of Service (N=3185)		
Less than 1 year	132	4.1
1-2 years	248	7.8
3-5 years	495	15.5
6-10 years	777	24.4
11-15 years	522	16.4
16-20 years	448	14.1
Over 20 years	563	17.7
Type of Assignment (N=3176)		
Patrol/on call/control/traffic	2489	78.4
Investigative/detective	335	10.5
Administrative/other	352	11.1

Current Study Design

Factor analysis was employed to determine whether the eleven vignettes used historically in the literature are accurate representations of behaviors that officers typically view as corruption. The intention here is to discover if officer integrity, as indicated by ratings of the seriousness of integrity infractions, can be globalized to these eleven vignettes. The use of data collected from a convenience sample with very limited measures of predictor variables is less problematic as the primary purpose of the current study is to explore measures of integrity, not to propose causal models that can be generalized. Klockars et al. (2000) identify the scenarios as ten cases of corruption (including working off duty) and one of excessive force. These case scenarios are presented in Figure 1. Excessive force can be viewed either as a category of police deviance in itself or as a severe form of corruption. Regardless, excessive force is a violation of integrity and therefore the scenario is included in this analysis to measure integrity. Another scenario describes working off duty at a security business. This behavior is not necessarily corrupt for many agencies and could even be encouraged in some situations as an additional source of revenue in a profession that has long been plagued by relatively low pay and benefits (Jenks, 2009).

Police Integrity Measures

Police integrity is defined as police officer perceptions regarding the seriousness of cases of corruption. Eleven indices were constructed based on officers' responses to the corruption case scenarios (minus working off duty). Officers used the same set of seven questions to assess each corruption case scenario (Figure 2), which provides standardized multi-item measures of officers' reactions to all scenarios. Coded responses to the seven questions following a case scenario were summed to create one measure. In items four and five of each case scenario, the verbal and written reprimand options were combined into one category in order to maintain categorical coding consistency with the other items (i.e. five categories per question or thirty-five per case scenario). Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach alpha scores for the eleven indices. The alphas were very high, ranging from 0.785 to 0.916, suggesting that each index is measuring one dimension of corruption.

Also, a general integrity index was constructed a priori by summing all ten case scenario index measures. Scores on the overall index ranged from 70-350 with a mean of 252.4 and standard deviation of 40.32, and the Cronbach alpha score for the overall index was also high: 0.877 (also in Table 2). While this alpha score implies a global integrity measure, factor analysis is a much more adequate method for exploring general integrity.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Integrity Indices

	Mean	S.D.	Alpha
Off-Duty Business (N=3131)	10.32	5.47	0.193
Receiving Meals (N=3156)	16.30	6.09	0.883
Receiving Holiday Gifts (N=3144)	18.28	7.04	0.916
Ignoring Officer DUI (N=3133)	19.27	6.77	0.895
Using Excessive Force (N=3147)	24.84	6.63	0.894
Supervisor Misusing Release Time (N=3152)	24.59	6.22	0.887
Auto Shop Kickback (N=3158)	28.10	6.07	0.896
Accepting Free Drinks after Hours (N=3159)	26.95	5.80	0.876
Stealing from Wallet (N=3164)	30.66	5.14	0.857
Ignoring Speeding (N=3163)	30.51	4.38	0.785
Stealing from Business (N=3143)	32.78	3.80	0.821

Results

Responses to each of the seven questions were combined into an additive index for all eleven vignettes. A factor analysis of all eleven additive indices was conducted using principal component analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded two factors explaining a total of 60.1% of the variance for the entire set of variables. Factor 1 was labeled corruption due to the high loadings by the following items: crime scene theft of watch, bribe from speeding motorist, theft from found wallet, drinks to ignore late bar closing, auto repair shop 5% kickback, supervisor holiday for tune-up, excessive force on a car thief, cover-up

of a police DUI accident, and holiday gifts from merchants. This first factor explained 49.7% of the variance. The second factor derived was labeled not corrupt. This factor was labeled as such due to the high loadings by the following factors: off duty security system business and free meals, discounts on beat. The variance explained by this factor was 10.4%. The KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity both indicate that the set of vignettes are at least adequately related for factor analysis. Substantively, this means that we have identified two clear patterns of response among officers – one pattern of responding to vignettes commonly viewed as corruption, and one pattern of responding to vignettes not commonly viewed as corruption.

Table 3
Factor Analysis of Vignettes Indices

Vignette	UnRotated		Rotated	
	F1	F2	F1	F2
Off-Duty Business	.394	.535	.082	.659
Free/Discounted Meals	.573	.599	.207	.803
Holiday Gifts from Merchants	.638	.458	.333	.712
Cover-up of Police DUI	.670	.141	.516	.450
Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-up	.695	-.012	.612	.329
Excessive Force on Car Thief	.739	-.145	.716	.235
Auto Repair 5% Kickback	.786	-.111	.740	.288
Bribe From Speeding Motorist	.783	-.138	.750	.262
Crime Scene Theft of Watch	.771	-.268	.803	.143
Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	.805	-.208	.804	.212
Theft from Found Wallet	.791	-.324	.848	.104
Initial Eigenvalues	Total Component 1 = 5.468		% of variance 49.705	
	Total Component 2 = 1.147		% of variance 10.431	

Conclusion

Over the years, it has been difficult to research and understand police integrity. While there have been obvious legal boundaries dictating acceptable police behavior, it is now clear that researching officer perceptions towards varying levels of police misconduct can be beneficial. It is essential to understand police

perception of violations of integrity, especially behavior consisting of misconduct and corruption, in order to create the structural foundation for stronger policies regulating police integrity. The analysis indicates that officers' perceptions group around of a wide variety of corrupt behavior, but also includes two vignettes, referring to having an off-duty business and accepting free meals and other gratuities as a courtesy, that are not typically regarded as corrupt.

Due to study limitations, results must be interpreted with caution. The integrity measures used in this analysis are limited in that they do not assess all aspects of police integrity. As Klockars et al. (2000) pointed out, the corruption case scenarios almost entirely consist of misconduct committed for personal gain (one case involves excessive use of force). Other violations of integrity such as abuse of discretion, rudeness to citizens, and other forms of misconduct usually not motivated by personal gain were not observed (Klockars et al. 2000). Also, while the data set used in this analysis contains the largest, most comprehensive, and most recent data available on police perceptions of integrity, it was drawn from a non-randomly selected sample and is somewhat dated (ten years old). The convenience sample was taken mostly from municipal agencies in the northeast region of the United States. Further, because some agencies and individual officers chose not to participate in the study, the sample is biased toward police agencies and officers that are more receptive to research and less fearful of analyses of their perceptions. The responses of the officers who volunteered may not represent the perceptions of those who were excluded or chose not to participate in the survey. Clearly, future research is needed to collect and analyze current data from different types of police agencies across varying regions of the US.

This study has important research and practice implications. To begin, since the study establishes that not all eleven vignettes typify behavior that is viewed as corrupt, some integrity measures are viable options in researching police integrity, while others are not. It becomes apparent that the most appropriate integrity measure to be used in research depends on the particular needs and goals of the research. For example, some researchers or agencies will be interested in examining a specific corruption problem while others are interested in activities more readily considered corruption. Thus, some scenarios are useful but limited.

Focusing on a specific corrupt act may not be adequate to indicate officers' risk of engaging in corruption; a perception of the seriousness of the case could be an exception to the way an officer usually perceives corruption. For example, it is possible that officers tend to tolerate free meals and working off duty because they believe that these activities are not a violation of the rules (even though they often are). If this is true, situational variables may sometimes predict officers' perceptions more than individual propensities. It is therefore foreseeable that researchers and agencies will eventually exclude vignettes that have historically been included. The current trend in research using this type of data is to include vignettes that this analysis illustrates are not viewed as corruption by police officers. The development and use of more appropriate vignettes is, then, another useful option in researching police officer integrity and developing policies and practices aimed at boosting integrity/reducing corruption.

Police administrators have tackled the issue of corruption by creating stricter hiring policies, thoroughly screening applicants, and aggressively removing officers who appear to be morally deficient (Haberfeld, Klockars, Ivković, & Pagnon, 2000). A revised instrument using only those vignettes that are viewed as serious corruption would better measure and assess the level of integrity of police and evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives intended to increase officer integrity. Agencies may wish to address integrity from a more practical framework, rather than incorporate issues that officers do not relate to issues of integrity in their experiences or observations. A more practical view of integrity is also more adaptable as opposed to relying on theoretical definitions where clear lines cannot be drawn. Integrity itself is vague and opaque and should be treated as such, rather than case and context bound over time. This is not to say that if police officers do not think that an act is corruption, then *it is not* corruption. The current analysis identifies patterns in the data; it does not establish what is substantively true. The proposition that accepting gratuities is not at least mildly corrupt, or unethical, is dubious. Gratuities could stand as symbolic bribes, putting the officer in a conflict of interest. Thus, an argument could be made that the excluded vignettes really *do* reflect corruption, at least in some form or to some extent. Regardless, it should be clear that the nature of police corruption and officer

integrity cannot be assumed, but rather must be thoroughly conceptualized and researched.

The current analysis seems to clearly note, however, that there are two integrity constructs in the data. Crudely, these may be conceptualized as light vs. serious types of integrity violations. Off-duty work, and free coffee and meals, represent 'conflict of interest' behaviors that could make officers more beholding to some citizens over others, not severe infractions (with a side business only potentially being a conflict of interest, if it interferes with work). These behaviors are definitely in the gray area of police deviance. At face value, the remaining items that load together look more like 'serious misconduct' as they involve more extreme cases of corruption for personal gain, unprofessional behavior, and abuse of authority. These behaviors are much less in the gray area, if at all. Researchers could still use all of the eleven measures in studies of corruption, but if they choose to use composite measures, they could examine 'conflict of interest' and 'serious misconduct' separately. Police involvement in conflict of interest behaviors could still be a problem, and they could also correlate with the more serious violations, so it would be informative to examine them as well. Further, low integrity on one composite measure but not on the other would help agencies see more specifically where they are having problems. The general point to be made is that it is important that researchers and practitioners recognize distinctions and commonalities across corrupt behaviors when explaining, assessing, and attempting to increase police officer integrity.

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